The NEM is rapidly transitioning to a lower-emissions generation profile, characterised by higher levels of near-zero marginal cost variable renewable generation. To encourage investors to take long-term capacity risk, we need market arrangements that explicitly value capacity, separately from the energy price, to support the quantum of build required over the next decade. The right incentives are needed to support the orderly retirement of thermal generators and timely investment in an efficient mix of resources (firm flexible generation, variable renewable energy and storage) to maintain reliability.
Over the same period, 26-50 GW of new, large scale variable renewable energy (in addition to existing, committed, and anticipated projects) will come online, supported by between 6GW and 19GW of new flexible and dispatchable resources. By 2040, up to 63 per cent of the current coal fleet in the national electricity market (NEM) is expected to retire.
The faster that new, more economic variable renewable electricity (VRE) comes into the market, putting downward pressure on energy spot and contract prices, the greater the pressure on existing, less economic generation to exit.
Under the current NEM design, new investment in generation relies on expectations that wholesale prices will be at sufficient levels long enough to provide adequate confidence, certainty and returns to investors. If the current spot price is not high enough, and expectations of sustained wholesale prices in the future are not held with enough confidence, then sufficient investment may not happen. Uncertainty attached to the level and composition of future demand, the timing of generation exits, technology costs, and government interventions all impact investor confidence.
The additions to the existing investment signals in the market and related arrangements will maintain reliability by delivering a more orderly exit of ageing thermal generation and its timely replacement by a mix of new resources.
We recognise that any market and related arrangements need to operate effectively in the presence of substantial government investment schemes. These schemes are likely to be an enduring part of the electricity market for the foreseeable future, and often embody broader policy objectives such as supporting community transition and jobs or delivering low emissions and renewable energy policy targets.
The Energy Security Board (ESB) handed its final advice on the national electricity market redesign to energy ministers on the Energy National Cabinet Reform Committee on 27 July 2021 and the advice was publicly released on 26 August 2021.
National Cabinet is now considering the full suite of recommendations.
In the interim, the ESB is continuing to work with the Australian Energy Market Commission (AEMC), Australian Energy Market Operator (AEMO) and the Australian Energy Regulator (AER) to progress reforms to the National Electricity Rules while the broader advice is being considered by governments.
Transparency of generator availability
This reform will help to identify risks of insufficient generation capacity early. An example would be knowing when a generator was planning to mothball a plant, and the time it would take for it to return to operation if needed.
Through its current obligations and functions, AEMO continuously monitors reliability in the NEM. The new information gathered through this reform will assist AEMO in providing more granular information to jurisdictions about generator availability, and in turn, reliability, and security outcomes in specific regions. AEMO can do this through official market publications where appropriate and its regular discussions with jurisdictions on a range of matters including ongoing reliability and security issues.
Jurisdictional strategic reserves (JSR)
A JSR would allow states and territories to procure any required reserves that individual jurisdictions consider necessary beyond the market reliability standard. This would involve the purchase of additional reserve capacity from generators that don’t participate in the NEM or large energy users who can temporarily reduce their usage, during periods of very high demand.
In the JSR recommended by the ESB, JSR capacity would not be allowed to participate in the normal day-to-day operation of the electricity system but would be kept ready, as other emergency reserves are, for when it is needed. For example, during heatwaves or when natural disasters interrupt transmission infrastructure. This will ensure that state and territory governments are able to maintain enough reserve capacity in their region to ensure reliable and secure electricity for their consumers as the percentage of weather dependent generators increases.
Amendments to the Interim Reliability Reserve – Consultation Paper
The ESB has released a consultation paper and draft rule that amends the interim reliability reserves. The paper also provides information about how jurisdictions can, under the current rules, fund their own out-of-market resources using AEMO’s short notice RERT panel. Both aspects work in tandem to action the P2025 recommendation to develop a NEM wide JSR.
The ESB recommended a JSR under the resource adequacy workstream of its P2025 review. In response to the request from Energy Ministers, the ESB undertook further analysis which found that the concept of the JSR can be operationalised under the current RERT framework, through the AEMO’s use of the short notice RERT Panel.
In considering how the existing short notice RERT panel could be leveraged to bolster RERT reserves in a particular region, the ESB identified another amendment that could be made to further facilitate backup measures for reliability in the NEM. This relates to removing a restriction on entering into multi-year interim reliability reserve contracts as the expiry of the interim reliability reserves rule approaches.
The amendment would increase the flexibility of the interim reliability reserve and provide AEMO with more options when procuring out of market reserves to address any forecast reliability gaps. The ESB considers this flexibility important in the coming years in light of uncertainty about reliability while longer-term resource adequacy mechanisms are being implemented.
The rule change does not seek to extend the existence of the interim reliability measure and it will continue to expire on 31 March 2025. Further, the current safeguards relating to multi-year contracting and interim reliability reserves would continue to exist if this amendment was made. These safeguards ensure the interim reliability reserve is only used as a last resort.
The ESB is undertaking this Rule change process in accordance with the Ministerial rule making powers under section 90F of the NEL.
The ESB invites comments from interested parties by 22 June 2022 on the:
The Energy Security Board (ESB) is progressing a recommendation from its Post 2025 Market Design final advice to implement a T-3 Ministerial lever for the Retailer Reliability Obligation (RRO) for all regions in the National Electricity Market (NEM), as is currently in place in South Australia.
- T3 trigger for the RRO – Consultation Paper
- T3 trigger for the RRO – Draft Bill
- T3 trigger for the RRO – Initial Rules
The RRO amendment is one element in the ESB’s broader suite of reforms addressing challenges of resource adequacy and ageing thermal generation retirement.
The proposed amendments are designed to deliver the following policy outcomes:
- provide a supporting policy lever to address reliability concerns in the NEM;
- implement a nationally consistent framework by extending the current legislative framework in South Australia to the other jurisdictions; and
- leverage the existing RRO framework which is well understood by market participants.
Stakeholders can register to attend a webinar exploring the issues raised in the paper on Tuesday 9 August, 12:15 -1pm (AEST). Submissions on the paper are due by Wednesday 17 August 2022.
Design of a capacity mechanism
Since 2010, 20 percent of NEM coal-fired generation has retired and a further 69 percent is expected to close by 2040. AEMO forecasts that up to 19 GW of fast, dispatchable generation, equivalent to more than six times the largest generator in the NEM, will be needed to firm up the influx of variable renewable energy – for the times when the sun isn’t shining, and the wind isn’t blowing. Currently, generators are only paid for the energy they produce.
A capacity mechanism, commonly found in most international markets facing similar challenges to Australia, creates a second marketplace for availability. This puts a value on generators being available during periods where demand could exceed supply. To ensure reliable supply is maintained as the share of renewables grows rapidly, the mechanism’s intention is to create a clear, long-term signal for investment, in both existing and new dispatchable capacity (such as coal, gas, batteries and hydro). Detailed design work is needed to settle the details of how a capacity mechanism could operate and the ESB will provide advice on a final design by the end of 2022.
- A scope of works document to provide stakeholders with more clarity about the approach and process that we intend to use to progress the design of a capacity mechanism
- A project initiation paper, which outlines the main components of a capacity mechanism and the potential options, and gives stakeholders the opportunity to provide their views on these matters
The papers are available here:
Orderly exit of ageing thermal generators
Orderly Exit Management Contracts are bilateral arrangements (usually between a government and a closing generator) that help to ensure that a generator does not exit the system until sufficient capacity can be brought online to replace it.
Alongside the design work on the capacity mechanism, the ESB has been asked to do further work on orderly exit management arrangements for ageing thermal generators that are complementary to, or part of, a capacity mechanism.
In the meantime, the ESB recommended jurisdictional investment scheme principles apply to them where they are used. These principles have been adopted by jurisdictions to guide the development of future government investment schemes. They help remove uncertainty for energy market investors and ensure government-supported investments best match the physical needs of the energy system.
Reliability (Price) settings work
The Australian Energy Market Commission (AEMC) is considering a rule change request from Dr Kerry Schott AO that seeks to align the Reliability Panel’s current reliability standards and settings review with this design process. The outcome of the rule, if made as proposed, will require the ESB to consider:
- the reliability (market) settings that would work alongside any recommended capacity mechanism to achieve the reliability standard
- what reliability (market) settings, if any, should be in place for the interim period before a capacity mechanism is implemented, taking into account the impact of the timing of any changes on the contract market, and the potential to place a freeze on the settings before the mechanism is implemented
- the reliability (market) settings that would achieve the reliability standard in the event a capacity mechanism is not agreed
The ESB notes that stakeholder engagement on each of the above scenarios for the price settings will be critical. The ESB and Panel are working to determine the best way that the ESB can leverage the Panel’s expertise and industry representation in the design process.
Milestones for deliverables for this market settings work and its interdependencies with the detailed design of the capacity mechanism will be published shortly.
As part of the Post-2025 market design reforms, Energy Ministers tasked the ESB with progressing detailed design work on a mechanism that specifically values capacity in the NEM. The ESB’s high-level design paper builds on stakeholder feedback received on the scope of works document and project initiation paper, which were released in December 2021, and the ESB’s further design work. The ESB has also been guided by the principles agreed to by Energy Ministers in September 2021.
The paper outlines the ESB’s preferred approach to key design choices, including:
- who is eligible to participate,
- the degree of centralisation of forecasting and procurement,
- the nature of the obligation placed on capacity providers in return for a capacity payment,
- the role of interstate trade, and
- how costs are passed through to customers.
The ESB is seeking stakeholder submissions on its proposed high-level design and the issues raised in the paper, with submissions due by 25 July 2022.
The ESB will continue working with stakeholders on developing the final design. The ESB will develop a draft detailed design by the end of the year, with a final recommendation due to Ministers early in 2023.
The papers are available here:
- Capacity Mechanism high-level design – Consultation paper
- Capacity Mechanism high-level design – Media release
On Friday 1 July 2022. The ESB held a stakeholder webinar to outline its proposed high-level design of a capacity mechanism. Materials from the webinar are available here:
The ESB received 388 submissions in response to its Capacity Mechanism High-level Design Consultation Paper, including 307 private individual submissions. Submissions can be viewed on the Energy Ministers website.
- Five-minute settlement (which began in October 2021) will deliver sharper real-time price signals to support efficient operational and investment signals, particularly for flexible and dispatchable resources.
- Wholesale demand response mechanism (which began in October 2021) is a transitional measure which will put demand response on equal footing with generation capacity, adding to the resources capable of providing resources at times of need.
- Reforms to the Reliability and Emergency Reserve Trader (RERT (already in place) including the reinstatement of the long notice RERT in June 2018 and enhancements to give AEMO greater flexibility in May 2019. Both contribute to the delivery of resource adequacy by providing a more effective backstop mechanism for AEMO to draw on when necessary.
- An interim out-of-market reserve (available if required from August 2020) that allows AEMO to procure reserves under contract terms of up to three years, replacing the long notice RERT. The volume of resources in the reserve will be those required to keep unserved energy to no more than 0.0006% in any region in any year for an interim period.
- Retailer reliability obligation designed to support resource adequacy by incentivising retailers and some large energy users to contract for or invest in resources to cover their share of expected peak demand in regions and for times when there is a forecast gap.
- Notice of closure requirements requiring scheduled and semi-scheduled generators to notify AEMO of the year they expect a generating unit to cease supplying electricity, and to regularly update, with the obligation being to provide the market at least 42 months’ notice.